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1. Introduction
The voter turnout and citizens’ attachment to political parties and trade unions have declined
significantly throughout Europe and Northern America. Citizens’ changing attitudes and expectations
towards government are stimulating a search for different democratic processes that move away from
traditional models of representative democracy (e.g., Dalton, 2004).
The modes of direct citizen involvement such as referendums, civic initiatives, deliberative
democracy, online democracy, and political consumerism (political involvement through
consumption choices) have been introduced and also applied in practice. A common denominator
underlying these direct modes of political involvement is a conviction that people would participate
more actively if they were offered more effective ways to be politically involved. However, this
viewpoint has been challenged by the theory of stealth democracy which argues that people want to
withdraw from politics.  They  do  not  want  to  make  political  decisions  themselves  and  they  do  not
want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, 2005).
The purpose of this study is to test citizens’ support for two rival models of political involvement,
political consumerism and stealth democracy, in relation to representative democracy in the context
of the Finnish energy policy-making. Thus, theoretical contribution of the study is to broaden the
conceptions of the relative importance of various forms of political involvement among the citizenry.
Methodologically, this study is based on postal surveys conducted among 18-75-year old Finns in
2007 and 2016.
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2The study  focuses  on  energy  policy,  a  societal  sector  where  citizens’  involvement  was  seen  to  be
more limited than in most other policy domains (Chubb, 1983, pp. 258-9). Energy policy was defined
here as political steering conducted by political decision-makers and public authorities focusing on
energy management. (Ruostetsaari, 2008). Some firms, especially state-owned and more generally,
those operating in the energy supply, have had privileged access to decision-making arenas, which
have remained mostly opaque for the citizens (Prontera, 2009, p. 23). Identical findings have also
been reported in Finland. Despite the new rules of the game – from monopolies and extensive
regulation via competition and deregulation to re-regulation – and the Europeanization of the Finnish
energy sector, a number of key decision-makers of energy policy has been fairly small and stable
from the end of 1980s to the end of the first decade of the 2000s. Energy policy-making have been
dominated by energy producers, even if the voice of large energy-consuming firms has grown. Civic
associations and consumer-citizens have had difficulty in gaining access to the decision-making of
energy policy (Ruostetsaari, 2010, pp. 291-4). However, citizens’ opportunities to make consumption
choices in the energy sector have increased because many countries, including Finland, have
discharged their energy monopolies or deregulated their energy policies which has strengthened the
role of market mechanisms.
Finland is a particularly suitable platform for a critical test of political consumerism and stealth
democracy for several reasons. First, in Finland popular support for political consumerism is one of
the highest by international standards together with other Nordic countries, Switzerland, and
Germany, with Southern and Eastern Europe lagging behind (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). Second,
Finns’ voter turnout and civil efficacy (the sense that one can understand political processes and
participate in them meaningfully) is low, while the trust in political and societal institutions, including
science and technology is high by international standards (e.g., Norris, 2011; Kestilä-Kekkonen,
2014; Rucht, 1997; Rask, 2008). Citizens’ trust in technology and experts has materialized in Finnisn
energy-policy-making. While construction of new nuclear power plants has been prohibited in many
3countries, the Parliament of Finland licensed the construction of two nuclear power plants in 2010.
Moreover, Finland is the first country in which the process for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel
in the bedrock has been authorized both at the national (Parliament in 2001) and local (municipal
council in 2000) levels (Litmanen and Kojo, 2011). Third, the Finnish societal context changed
dramatically from 2007 to 2016 due to sharp changes in economic development and the legitimacy
of political system. We may anticipate that these economic and political fluctuations reflected to
citizens’ attitudes and increased their willingness to complement or  replace the electoral participation
with other modes of political involvement to influence energy policy-making.
The study proceeds as follows. First, the theoretical starting points dealing with political consumerism
and stealth democracy are defined. The hypotheses that direct the empirical analysis will be derived
from this theoretical reflection. Second, societal context of the Finnish case study is specified by
outlining the deteriorating economic fluctuations and outbreak of a major political scandal.  Third,
research method and the data are described. Fourth, the analysis is composed of three sections where
the  effects  of  social  background  on  the  endorsement  of  of  political  consumerism  and  stealth
democracy as well as the interrelationship between political consumerism and stealth democracy are
analysed. Finally, conclusions are made based on empirical analysis and the findings are discussed in
light of the theoretical starting points.
2. Political consumerism as a mode of political involvement
Political consumerism may substitute for conventional forms of participation that are increasingly
perceived as less efficient and less suitable for the global nature of political problems (Stolle and
Hooghe, 2006, p. 266). According to Stolle and Micheletti (2013, pp. 39, 24), political consumerism
can be defined as “actions taken by those who make choices among producers, products, and services
with the aim of changing objectionable institutional or market practices.” Their choices are based on
4attitudes and values concerning issues of justice and fairness, or noneconomic issues regarding
personal or family well-being, as well as ethical assessments of favorable business and governmental
practices. Consumption can be a venue for people to express themselves politically or set the political
agenda of other actors and institutions, such as government and business. The concept combines the
two traditions of consumption and citizenship, which tended to be located in opposing spheres of
private and public life (see Follesdahl, 2006).
For the realization of political consumerism, first, individual motivation is essential: citizens have to
be motivated to both seek and use information to develop values and to formulate preferences or an
ethical compass that facilitates the making of reasonable choices. Second, they must feel that their
actions matter, that is, they must have a sense of agency or empowerment to engage in the choice
practices associated with individualized responsibility-taking. Thus, a sense of civic efficacy is an
important individual attribute for political consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti 2013).
Many  scholars  (E.g.,  Barnes  and  Kaase,  1979;  Tarrow,  2000)  have  been  worried  that  new
unconventional acts, such as protesting, would crowd out conventional forms of participation. The
fundamental question is, as also presented in this study: are political consumers alienated from the
political system, causing them to resort to new, non-electoral approaches of participation exclusively,
or do they use various types of participation and voice simultaneously, whereby political
consumerism becomes an additional tool in their expanding political action repertoires? (Stolle and
Micheletti, 2013, pp. 65-6).
Political consumerism has been found to be connected to the citizen agency of higher education, of
young people, and of women (e.g. Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). Therefore, these variables will be
employed in this study in order to compare citizens’ attitudes on political consumerism and stealth
democracy.
5Political consumerism requires more resources and skills from the participants to compensate for the
missing institutional framework. Education, especially tertiary education, can contribute in at least
three ways. First, it gives individuals the skills they need if they are to effectively participate in
politics. Second, political consumers necessarily must have high levels of political interest and
political information to find out about and act upon issues in the marketplace. Generally, levels of
political interest and political information increase with higher education. Third, education is
positively associated with income and because political consumerism involves selectively purchasing
goods, it also requires significant expenditures. Thus, education levels might be critical in an indirect
way to  those  who practice  political  consumerism (Stolle  and  Micheletti,  2013,  p.  62).  Thus,  with
regard to influencing the Finnish energy policy, we hypothesize, first, that the higher the individual’s
level of education, the more she or he endorses political consumerism (H1.1).
The attractiveness of political consumerism for young people is not well studied, but seems that an
important explanation is the appeal of life-style politics among the young, trends towards
individualization, and their tendency to find the formal political sphere alienating (Micheletti, 2003,
pp. 17-8). It seems, however, plausible that the youngest, although inclined to Internet activism and
other protest activities, might not be as susceptible to political consumerism because of lack of
resources. The middle-aged cohort, who face mobilizational life-cycle effects such as children,
careers, and a general peak of involvement might be more active in political consumerism (Stolle and
Micheletti, 2013, p. 64). We hypothesize, second, that the middle-aged cohorts endorse more political
consumerism than the youngest and the oldest cohorts (H1.2).
Three factors explain the role of women in political consumerism. First, women are assumed to have
responsibility for shopping for the family on a daily basis. They are thus more involved with consumer
issues than men or children. Second, studies show that women have a lower risk perception threshold
than men. Third, because women have historically been excluded from institutions in the public
sphere and their issues have been seen as non-political, they have been forced to create other sites to
6express their political concerns and work for their political interests (Micheletti, 2003, pp. 17-18;
Goul Andersen and Tobiasen, 2006, p. 208). Thus, we hypothesize, third, that women endorse
political consumerism more than men (H1.3).
3. Vision of stealth democracy on citizens’ political involvement
Political scientists have studied citizens’ support for specific policies, political parties, governmental
institutions, and for democracy in general, but citizens have not often been asked in detail about their
attitudes on how they want their government to work. Americans, for example, were found to be
attuned to the way government works more than to what it produces (i.e., they pay attention to the
processes more than the policies) (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005). Also Finnish political scientists
have analysed empirically citizens’ attitudes on the working of democratic processes (Bengtsson and
Mattila, 2009; Bengtsson, 2012; Ruostetsaari, 2017).
According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2005, pp. 1-2, 12, 139-143), rather than wanting a more
active, participatory democracy, a large number of people want what they call stealth democracy.
Their claim is that the people do not routinely play an active role in decision-making, or in providing
input for or monitoring decision-makers. People want to distance themselves from government not
because of a system defect but because many people are simply averse to disagreement and political
conflict and believe political conflict is unnecessary and an indication that something is wrong with
governmental procedures.
Determining appropriate policy action requires no elaborate institutions and powerful elected
officials. Because of elected representatives, people do not need to constantly pay attention to many
issues about which they do not care. Due to that individuals are often too uninformed, unmotivated,
or narrow-minded to exert appropriate political influence, politicians, experts and businessmen should
7make the decisions for them. Elites are not what the citizens fear; rather, it is self-serving elites who
are feared (ibid).
Citizens’ dissatisfaction toward government usually stems from perceptions of how government does
its business, not what the government does; the policy matters, but process, rather than policy, is often
a better predictor of citizens’ attitudes and behaviors with respect to government (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, 2005). The fact that citizens have preferences for policy and process has also been shown in
European studies. In the absence of clearly formulated interests and related identities that
representatives could work to promote, elected officials have become more detached from their
constituency. Voting has come to resemble a Schumpeterian (1959) picture of democratic elitism
where the main concern is to elect people into positions of power, leaving actual issues of substance
and policy directions largely indeterminable. This is a particular concern in the Finnish multiparty
system where citizens can never know at the ballot box exactly how their votes will be used, which
political  parties  will  form  the  government  coalition,  and  what  objectives  they  will  adopt  in  the
government program (Paloheimo and Borg, 2009).
However, the stealth democracy claim that the experts are legitimate policy-makers equal to the
elected officials, has long been challenged by several scholars. According to Frank Fischer (1990),
fundamental to the critique of technocratic expertise is the argument that experts have relied too much
on and misused scientific and technical knowledge. We argue that this challenge especially concerns
the energy policy: perceiving the societal and environmental effects of various ways to produce
energy requires that citizens have some understanding of energy technology.
Western science and technology policy has generally been seen as a policy sector that is dominated
by experts and public administration, where political decision-makers have neither played, nor had
an aspiration to play a role (Kuitunen and Lähteenmäki-Smith, 2006; Peterson and Sharp, 2001). This
is also the case in Finland; governmental policy-making in the field of science and technology has
been dominated by experts, perhaps more so than any other policy sector (Lemola, 2004). However,
8Finns have trusted most in the technology among various actors or devices in solving environmental
problems caused by energy production and consumption (Ruostetsaari, 2010).
We anticipate that there are differences between various socio- demographic citizen groups in terms
of the endorsement of stealth democracy. According to the Finnish election study, the privileged
citizens, on the average, vote more actively in general elections and have a higher civic efficacy than
the less privileged; the highly educated vote more actively, have better political knowledge, and feel
more civic efficacy than the poorly educated. The middle age cohort is politically more active and
has better political knowledge than young and elderly people, but has a lesser sense of civic efficacy
than the youngest cohorts. Women have lesser political knowledge and the sense of civic efficacy
although they vote more actively than men (Wass and Borg, 2016, pp. 183-186; Rapeli and Borg,
2016, pp. 361-363). Thus, we hypothesize that the lower the individual’s level of education, the more
she or he endorses stealth democracy (H2.1); the middle-aged cohorts endorse less stealth democracy
than the youngest and the oldest cohorts (H2.2); and men support more stealth democracy than
women (H2.3).
The citizens’ attitudes on political consumerism and stealth democracy are expected to be the reverse
in terms of education, age, and gender which is manifested in the hypotheses H1 and H2. Thus, we
anticipate that stealth democracy can be seen as a reaction among people who feel powerless in the
face of the regime, while the supporters of political consumerism have a higher sense of civil efficacy,
i.e., they feel that they can influence energy policy directly through their consumption choices rather
than through representative democracy. Thus, we hypothesize that the endorsement of political
consumerism and stealth democracy correlates negatively with the electoral participation as a mode
of influencing energy policy-making (H3). The hypothesis is based on the notion that both political
consumerism and stealth democracy may be seen as alternative modes of political involvement or
attitudes on conventional electoral participation. We hypothesize, finally, that citizens’ support for
political consumerism and stealth democracy has increased in the context of government’s
9decreasing political and economic output from 2007 to 2016 (H4). These social changes have
challenged the legitimacy of the political system among the citizenry.
4. Finland as a case study
After the early 1990s, the societal operating environment of the Finnish decision-makers and the
general population was dominated by deep economic fluctuations. The Finnish economy collapsed
more drastically in the early 1990s than any other developed market economy after the Second World
War (Kuisma and Keskisarja, 2012) and the country plunged into the deepest recession in its history.
Social services were cut, and the welfare state began to disintegrate as a result of the cuts in
government expenditures. This “great recession” in 1991-1993 was followed by rapid economic
growth based mainly on governmental investments in research and development and the expansion
of the electronics industry, especially Nokia Ltd. However, Finland’s economic boom was halted in
2008 by the international financial crisis and the euro zone crisis. Due to that the Finnish economy is
heavily dependent on exports, the gross national product decreased by 8% in 2009 compared with
2008. Although this recession was only about half as severe as the recession of the 1990s, the GNP
still decreased in Finland more than in other euro area countries and in those EU member states that
had joined the European Union before 2004 (Pohjola, 2010). The recession originating from 2008
lasted longer than that of the early 1990s; According to a forecast of Bank of Finland, the 2008 GNP
will be exceeded not until 2019 (Helsingin Sanomat, 2017).
In particular, the Finnish political decision-makers was shaken by the election campaign funding
scandal of 2008, which was the most serious political scandal in Finland to date as measured by
publicity surrounding the events (Kantola, 2011, p. 165). This scandal together with the international
financial crisis, the crisis of the euro zone and the Greek and Portuguese bail-outs dominated public
debate in 2008-2011 and undermined the legitimacy of the major political parties affecting the results
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of the 2011 general election; the electoral support of the populist Finns’ Party increased from 4.1%
in 2007 to 19.1% in 2011 and 17.7% in 2015. Thus, the legitimacy of the political rule was called
into question.
A withdrawal from the channels of conventional political activism also applies to Finland. The voter
turnout in Finland (67.9% in the 2007 general election; 70.5% in 2011; and 70.1% in 2015) was
within the lowest third of all Western democracies, and it has decreased more sharply than in many
other countries, especially within Scandinavia (Norris, 2011). While citizens’ trust in government
decreased by an average of two percentage points in member states of Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (from 45% to 43%) between 2007 and 2015, in Finland and Spain the
decrease was one of the largest, 20 percentage points (from 76% to 56%) (OECD, 2017). However,
Finns’ confidence in societal institutions has been high by international standards. Finns’ trust in the
political and legal systems and in other people was the highest among the 28 EU member states in
2013 (Eurostat 2015). Moreover, Finns’ attitude was the second most positive after Denmark for the
overall influence of companies on society among the 27 EU member states and Brazil, China, India,
Turkey, and the US (Eurobarometer 2013). In fact, Finns’ confidence in expert institutions such as
universities as well as science and research in general has increased from 2007 to 2016. While in
2007 51% percent of Finns perceived that science can solve very or fairly well energy problems, in
2016 the share was much higher, 65% (Science Barometer, 2016).
Simultaneously, Finnish people’s high trust in societal institutions has been accompanied by low
subjective civil efficacy which has been at a much lower level than in Europe on average. In 2008, it
was the third lowest among 23 European countries (Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2014). Finns’ low civic
efficacy concerns also energy policy-making. More than a half of the citizens were dissatisfied with
their  potential  to  influence  energy  policy;  the  proportion  of  the  citizenry  who  agreed  (fully  or
somewhat) with the statement that “citizens’ opinions have not been heard sufficiently enough in
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energy policy decisions” was 71% (mean) in 1983-1993, 67% in 1994-2000, and 64 % in 2001-2007
(Energy Attitudes, 2007).
All in all, the Finnish attitudinal climate characterized by a mix of low voter turnout, low civic
efficacy but high trust in political and science institutions may have created incentives among the
citizenry to look for alternative means for traditional political involvement, i.e., influencing energy
policy through their own consumption choices (political consumerism), or leaving decision-making
to experts rather than politicians.
5. Method and data
Methodologically,  this  study  was  based  on  a  postal  survey  (and  Internet  survey  in  2016)  that  was
conducted among a random sample representing 18-75-year old Finns. The field-work, covering one
reminder round, was carried out in May-October 2007 and August–October 2016. Even if the rate of
response was rather low (30.0% in 2007 and 33.6% in 2016), the large size of the sample (N=4000)
ensures that the data adequately represent the Finnish population at large (see also Ruostetsaari,
2017). Because the questionnaires were identical in both surveys, we can compare to what extent
citizens’ attitudes on energy policy have changed from 2007 to 2016. The year 2007 portrays the
period when the economic growth was rapid and the legitimacy of the political system was fairly
strong among the population. However, the year 2016 depicts the period preceded by a prolonged
recession and declining legitimacy of the political system.
However , the data deviates in minor respects from the population at large (Table 1). Compared to
the population at large, the highly educated were overrepresented, while individuals with only basic
education were underrepresented in the samples. In terms of education fields, people educated in the
engineering and service branch were somewhat underrepresented. With regard to occupational
position, lower functionaries were underrepresented, while managers and upper functionaries, blue-
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collar workers and pensioners were somewhat overrepresented. Individuals living in detached houses
were clearly overrepresented and those living in attached houses or apartment houses were
underrepresented. In addition to the background variables listed in Table 1, people living in small
municipalities (4,000-8,000 inhabitants) were somewhat overrepresented, while those living in large
municipalities (more than 80,000 inhabitants) were underrepresented. However, the respondents
represented  the  various  regions  of  the  country  (provinces)  with  an  even  distribution.  (Statistics
Finland, 2008; 2016).   Moreover, it was possible that the respondents were somewhat more interested
in energy issues than the general Finnish population. In 2007, 26% had changed their electricity
supplier, while in 2016 the share was as high as 52%.
Table 1 about here
6. Endorsement of political consumerism
The respondents to surveys conducted in 2007 and 2016 were asked how useful they perceived
various devices in influencing energy policy. The response options were “very useful”, “fairly
useful”, “fairly useless”, “totally useless”, and “can’t say” (Table 2).
Citizens’ attitudes regarding their possibility of influencing energy policy through consumption
choices were very positive. The most useful devices in 2007 and 2016 were instructing children on
energy issues and choosing energy-pinching appliances which epitomizes so-called discursive
political consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013).
Table 2 here
However, the endorsement of almost all single forms of political consumerism decreased from 2007
to 2016. The endorsement increased only in three cases; asking for competitive tenders from
electricity companies, contacts with representatives of energy producing firms, and using “green
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energy”. The common denominator for these devices is making use of the liberalized competition in
the electricity market with regard to households in 1998 (Ruostetsaari, 2010).
The most interesting finding was that voting in elections (15th) and the modes that can be termed here
as  participatory  political  consumerism,  i.e.,  contacts  with  MPs  (21st), acting in civic associations
(17th), contacts with representatives of energy producing firms (18th), and contacts with public
authorities (19th),  were  ranked  as  clearly  less  useful  devices  to  influence  energy  policy  than  all
traditional forms of political consumerism.
In order to assess whether the attitudes on political consumerism affect those of representative
democracy (i.e., voting in general elections as a useful device in influencing energy policy), citizens
were divided into two dichotomous groups based on citizens’ attitudes on various devices listed in
Table 2. These groups were supporters (responding with very or fairly useful) and non-supporters
(fairly  or  total  useless,  or  can’t  say)  of  political  consumerism.  We  constructed  a  sum  variable
comprising all devices queried in 2007 and 2016 (excluding “voting in elections” which represents
the conventional political participation). This dichotomous grouping of respondents and the sum
variable will also be used in the following analyses.
Among the supporters of political consumerism, 69% perceived voting in elections as a useful (very
or fairly useful) device to influence energy policy in 2007 and 2016, while the proportion of non-
supporters was 48% in 2007 and 43% in 2016. Among the adherents to political consumerism, 25%
regarded voting useless (totally or somewhat useless) in 2007 and 30% in 2016, while the proportion
of non-supporters was 50% in 2007 and 47% in 2016. Taking account all respondents, the number of
adherents to political consumerism increased from 45% in 2007 to 48% in 2016 which was below the
support for conventional political involvement (“voting in elections”; 57% in 2007 and 56% in 2016).
7. Endorsement of stealth democracy
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To test whether citizens are willing to assign the decision-making of energy policy to experts
representing public administration and business rather than elected officials the respondents were
asked a structured question, as follows: “How great is the importance that you attach to following
principles in energy policy-making?” The response options were “very important”, “fairly important”,
“not really important”, “not important at all”, and “can’t say” (Table 3). To test our hypotheses, we
constructed a sum variable from five of the statements mentioned in Table 3. The five statements all
depict  the  claim of  stealth  democracy,  as  follows:  “experts  should  be  in  charge  of  the  drafting  of
decisions”, “experts should be in charge of decision-making”, “representatives of firms should take
part in decision-making”, “business organizations should play a central role in the decision-making”,
and “decisions should be made by consensus as a result of negotiations”. The mean support (very or
somewhat important) for the sum variable among the citizenry was 71% in 2007 and 72% in 2016,
which exceeded support for representative democracy, i.e. the statement according to which “those
politically responsible to the constituency should be in charge of decisions”. However, citizens’
attitudes on all of the normative statements concerning energy policy-making have changed
marginally from 2007 to 2016.
Table 3 here
Popular support for four out of five above-mentioned statements exceeded that for the representative
democracy excluding one statement according to which “business organizations should play a central
role in decision-making”. Our finding that citizens were willing to see political  power more in the
hands of non-elected experts than businessmen was in agreement with Bengtsson and Mattila’s (2009,
p. 1040) survey conducted among Finns in 2007 (not focused on energy policy). They found that
approximately 30% were in favor of giving power to more pronounced experts, while less than 20%
wished to give more power to business leaders. These proportions are lower than in our survey that
focused on energy policy. Results from the World Values Survey of 1995, however, provided a
different result, which indicated that political or economic factors might strongly influence the
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answers. Finland showed the strongest support among Western democracies for an extended use of
expert rule in political matters. As much as 61% of the Finnish respondents gave a positive response
to this question in 1995, compared with 33% in Norway, 34% in the US and 38% in Sweden (ibid).
8. The effect of social background on the endorsement of political consumerism and stealth
democracy
8.1. Education
Education is generally seen to enhance civic participation by developing skills such as analytical and
rhetorical skills, which are relevant in politics (see Verba, Lehman Schlozman and Brady, 1995).
However, basic education did not explain statistically Finns’ adherence to political consumerism even
if the support was highest in 2016 among citizens who completed high school. In terms of the sum
variable that measured the support for various devices of political consumerism on the average, the
dependence was not statistically significant. However, in terms of individual devices, the dependence
was significant (p<.05) in 14 of 22 cases in 2007, and in 15 of 24 cases in 2016, respectively (Table
4).
Table 3 here
Similarly, vocational education did not affect the citizens’ trust in political consumerism as a means
of  influencing  energy  policy.  In  terms  of  the  sum  variable,  the  effect  of  educational  level  on  the
endorsement of political consumerism was not statistically significant. However, in terms of
individual devices, a statistically significant dependence (p<.05) was observed in 17 of 22 cases in
2007, but only in eight of 24 cases were statistically significant in 2016. Thus, our hypothesis (H1.1)
whereby the higher the individual’s level of education is, the more she endorses political
consumerism, was not verified.
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In terms of stealth democracy, we hypothesized that, in contrast to the case of political consumerism,
the lower the individual’s level of education, the more she or he endorses stealth democracy (H2.1).
We anticipated that highly educated people would support stealth democracy less than other people
would because well-off people have more material and knowledge-based resources at their disposal
with which to influence than the more disadvantaged. Thus, well-off people do not have to rely on
experts as much as the disadvantaged.
Neither basic education nor vocational education explained statistically the adherence to stealth
democracy. The adherence to stealth democracy was not highest among people with the lowest
education level (primary school) but among individuals with elementary school education. In terms
of vocational education, the support was lowest among the least educated citizens, i.e., those who had
no occupational education at all in 2007 and 2016, rather than among the most highly educated
citizens. Thus, our finding differed from that of a Finnish survey conducted in 2007 among the general
population in which the support for stealth democracy correlated with lower education levels
(Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009). Thus, our hypothesis (H2.1) was not verified.
8.2 Age and Gender
We hypothesized (H1.2) that the middle age cohorts endorse political consumerism more than the
youngest and oldest cohorts. In fact, the endorsement of political consumerism was highest in 2007
and 2016 among the third oldest cohort, which comprised 45-59-year-old citizens. However, the
hypothesis was verified in 2016 but only partly in 2007. The dependence was not statistically
significant.
Because we expected that the middle cohorts are politically more active and have better political
knowledge than the young and elderly people, we anticipated that the middle cohorts would less
strongly endorse stealth democracy than the youngest and the oldest cohorts (H2.2). However, our
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hypothesis was not verified. The endorsement of stealth democracy increased linearly from the
youngest age cohort of 18-29-year-olds to the oldest age cohort of 60-75-year-olds. Age was the only
socio-demographic variable that explained statistically the endorsement of stealth democracy in 2007
and 2016.
The endorsement of political consumerism depended significantly on gender. Women perceived all
devices listed in Table 1 as more useful than men in influencing energy policy. Gender was the only
socio-demographic variable for which the endorsement of political consumerism was statistically
dependent. The dependence was statistically significant (p<.05) in terms of all devices excluding one
device in 2007 and three devices in 2016, even if the correlations were low (Pearson’ R -.196 in 2007
and -.103 in 2016, respectively). Even if the proportion of political consumers decreased among
women but increased among men, we can conclude that our hypothesis (H 1.3) that women endorse
political consumerism more than men, was verified.
Moreover, we hypothesized that men support stealth democracy more than women (H2.3). However,
the hypothesis was not verified and the endorsement of stealth democracy was not statistically
dependent on gender (p>.05).
9. Interrelationship between representative democracy, political consumerism and stealth
democracy
We have shown above that the citizens prioritized the involvement of experts and businessmen more
than that of elected officials in energy policy-making and they supported political consumerism more
than voting in elections as their devices to influence energy policy. But how citizens’ attitudes on
political consumerism can be related to that of stealth democracy?
We argued that political consumerism and stealth democracy can be seen as alternative modes of
political involvement or as different attitudes on conventional policy-making. Thus, we hypothesized
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that the endorsement of political consumerism and stealth democracy correlates negatively with the
conventional political participation, i.e., voting in elections as a mode of influencing energy policy-
making (H3). Stealth democracy may be seen as a reaction among people who feel powerless in the
face of the regime, while the supporters of political consumerism are citizens who have a higher sense
of civil efficacy. The statements presented in Table 5 epitomizes the sense of civic efficacy in terms
of energy policy-making.
In 2007, 44% of citizens agreed (fully or somewhat) with the statement “I am well acquainted with
energy issues”, while the proportion (57%) was higher in 2016. In 2007 and 2016, the support for
stealth democracy was higher among citizens who felt that they were knowledgeable in energy issues
than among those who were not. While the supporters of political consumerism in 2007 felt that they
were less knowledgeable about energy issues than non-supporters, the relationship was the reverse in
2016. However, statistically there was no dependence (p>.05) between the endorsement of political
consumerism and stealth democracy and the level of knowledge about energy issues (however, in the
case of stealth democracy in 2016 p<.001).
Table 5 here
In 2016, 52% of people agreed with the statement that “citizens’ opinions have not been heard
sufficiently in energy policy decisions” (29% disagreed). The Finns’ overall sense of powerlessness
has decreased significantly; in 1983-2007, the proportion of those who agreed with this statement
was more than 60% (Energy Attitudes 2007). However, the support for both political consumerism
and stealth democracy reflects critical attitude on energy policy-making; the supporters of political
consumerism and stealth democracy were more sceptical than non-supporters that citizens’ opinions
were heard in energy policy-making (p<.001).
Generally, the sense of civil efficacy among the general population was low: only 25 % of citizens in
2007 and 24% in 2016 perceived that they could influence the Finnish energy policy by their own
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action. However, the endorsement of both political consumerism and stealth democracy increased
citizens’ civil efficacy, i.e., trust in their possibilities to influence energy policy-making (p<.001,
however, for stealth democracy in 2007 p<.05). The sense of civil efficacy was higher among
supporters of political consumerism than among those who approve of stealth democracy.
Energy issues have not played an important role in the Finnish electoral arena (Borg and Moring,
2005, p. 54). In our data the number of citizens who admitted that energy issues had affected their
voting decision in the last general election was 25% in 2007 and 23% in 2016. However, among the
supporters of both political consumerism (p<.001) and stealth democracy (p<.05), the effect of energy
issues on their voting decision was larger than among non-supporters. Moreover, the supporters of
both political consumerism and stealth democracy experienced voting in elections as a useful device
for influencing energy policy more generally than non-supporters (p<.001).
The dependence between the endorsement of political consumerism and the perceived usefulness of
voting in elections was statistically significant (p<.001), and the correlation (Pearson’s R) was
positive, although not high (.337 in 2007 and .365 in 2016). With respect to connection between the
endorsement of stealth democracy and the perceived usefulness of voting in elections, the dependence
was statistically significant (p<.001) but the correlation was low (-.142 in 2007; .260 in 2016).
Thus, political consumerism and stealth democracy cannot be mainly seen as alternative modes for
electoral participation but rather as complementary modes, and the hypothesis (H3) was not verified.
Moreover, they cannot be seen as detached attitudes on political involvement; the dependence
between the endorsement of political consumerism and stealth democracy was statistically significant
in 2007 and 2016 (p<.001), even if the correlation was rather low (.202 in 2007 and .316 in 2016). In
other words, in 2007, 49% of the supporters of stealth democracy also endorsed political
consumerism, while in 2016 the proportion was 53%. However, stealth democracy can be seen more
as a reaction of people who feel powerless in the face of the regime, while the supporters of political
consumerism have a higher sense of civil efficacy, which can be seen in Table 5.
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Finally, we hypothesized that citizens’ support for political consumerism and stealth democracy has
increased in the context of government’s decreasing political and economic output from 2007 to 2016
(H4).  This hypothesis was verified: while the proportion of political consumers increased from 45%
to 48%, the number of adherents to stealth democracy grew from 71 % to 72% in 2007-2016.
10. Conclusion and discussion
The purpose of this study was to test Finns’ support for two rival interpretations of citizen
involvement, political consumerism and stealth democracy, in relation to representative democracy
in the context of energy policy. Based on the findings of studies focusing on political consumerism
and Finnish electoral studies, we hypothesized that the higher the individual’s level of education, the
more she or he endorses political consumerism (H1.1), the middle cohorts endorse more political
consumerism than the youngest and the oldest cohorts (H1.2), and women more actively endorse
political consumerism than men (H1.3). Because we expected stealth democracy to be an opposite
attitude to political consumerism with respect to political involvement, the hypotheses dealing with
stealth democracy (H2.1-H2.3) were reversed.
The hypotheses dealing with education were falsified. With respect to age, the hypothesis was verified
for political consumerism in 2016, but it was only partly supported in 2007, while for stealth
democracy the hypothesis was not supported in 2007 and 2016. In terms of gender, the hypothesis
was verified for political consumerism because women endorsed it more than men. However, with
respect to stealth democracy the hypothesis was falsified; men did not support stealth democracy
more than women.
Third, we hypothesized that the endorsement of political consumerism and stealth democracy
correlates negatively with the electoral participation as a mode of influencing energy policy-making
(H3). However, the endorsement of political consumerism and stealth democracy increased citizens’
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trust in their possibility to influence energy policy by their own action, the energy issues had a greater
effect on the voting decisions of the supporters’ than on those of non-supporters, and the supporters
experienced voting in general elections as a more useful device in influencing energy policy than
non-supporters. Thus, the hypothesis was not verified. Hence, our theoretical conclusion is that
political consumerism and stealth democracy cannot be seen as alternative and detached modes for,
or attitudes toward electoral participation but rather they can be seen as complementary. However,
stealth democracy can be seen more as a reaction of people who feel powerless in the face of the
regime, while the supporters of political consumerism have a higher sense of civil efficacy.
The effects of cyclical fluctuations of the Finnish economy (the recession in 1991-1993, 2008-2016;
economic boom in 1994-2007) and the election funding scandal (2008) on the endorsement of
political consumerism and stealth democracy in the context of energy policy have remained minor.
This is consistent with previous studies that indicated that the effect of macro-economic conditions
on the citizens’ attitudes and behavior is minor. Scholars have tested whether societal conditions,
such as a booming economy, cause people to be satisfied with government. Although surges in
support for government sometimes seem to occur during strong economic times, systematic analyses
invariably question the role of economic conditions. Policy performance explains little when it comes
to public trust in political institutions (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). However, it has been observed that
citizens’ perceptions of national economy have more effect on their voting decisions than changes in
macro-economic conditions (Evans, 2004).
As the recession reduced citizens’ economic resources, their consumption choices were likely based
more on the economic consumerism than on political consumerism which reflects more post-
materialistic values. This was seen especially in that the endorsement of all the individual means in
influencing energy policy decreased after 2007, excluding those that may provide economic benefits,
i.e., asking for competitive tenders from electricity companies, contacts with representatives of
energy producing firms, and using “green energy”. The common denominator for these devices is
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more economic consumption than political consumerism, making use of the liberalized competition
in the electricity market.
However, measured by the sum variable the proportion of political consumers increased slightly from
45% to 48% %, while the number of adherents to stealth democracy grew from 71 % to 72% in 2007-
2016. Thus, the hypothesis (H4) was verified. The popularity of both political consumerism and
stealth democracy exceeded markedly the support for representative democracy in influencing energy
policy. But how can we explain a considerable difference in citizen support for political consumerism
and stealth democracy?
Because citizens’ perceive political institutions (the government and parliament) as trustworthy in
general, and influential in energy policy-making (Ruostetsaari, 2018) political consumerism may not
appear to be a particularly good option for conventional political participation among citizens with
low civic efficacy because the sense that one can understand political processes and participate in
them meaningfully is a prerequisite for political consumerism. Thus, voting in elections makes a
difference. The voting turnout increased slightly after the 2007 general election. The protest against
the consequences of the recession and the election funding scandal were not presented in the streets,
but rather they were channeled to the parliamentary arena as landslide victories of the populist Finns
Party  in  the  general  elections  of  2011  and  2015,  which  shook  the  whole  political  system.  It  is
important to note that the election funding scandal did not concern energy policy-making.
The fact that Finns support clearly more stealth democracy than political consumerism can be
explained by the characteristics of the Finnish political culture where high trust, by international
standards, in political and legal systems, firms, and technology (i.e., experts) is associated with low
civic efficacy, and half-hearted appreciation of democracy (a characteristic of stealth democracy).
For instance, according to World Values Survey 2005-2007, Finns’ confidence in public sector
institutions (parliament, political parties, the national government, the civil service, justice, police,
and the military) was highest among 16 older liberal democracies (the second highest in Norway, and
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5th highest in Sweden), while their overt approval of a democratic political system was  lowest, being
highest among Swedes and Norwegians (Norris, 2011, pp. 88-93).
Our finding that citizens’ support for stealth democracy exceeds that of representative democracy
suggest that they prefer an open and expertise-based decision-making process rather than its
outcomes. This stance can be explained by the fact expectations with regard to representation have
changed. Rather than working to push interests through and demonstrating ideological camaraderie,
elected officials are first and foremost expected to show empathy and presence. Several studies have
shown that citizens remain sensitive, or are even more sensitive than before, to the behavior, empathy,
or the lack of empathy shown by rulers than they are to the actual content of their decisions
(Rosanvallon, 2008). It is evident that there is a need for studies that compare the views of political
decision-makers, experts and citizens on policy-making processes of various societal sectors
(procedures, participants) with that of policy outputs (content of decisions, effects on various
stakeholders).
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Table 1: The respondents to the surveys compared with the whole population (%)
Respondents
in 2007
Population
in 2007
Respondents
in 2015
Population
in 2015
Level of education
Only basic education 13.4 35.9 9.4 29.8
Upper secondary 41.1 38.3 40.7 40.5
Tertiary 45.5 25.8 49.9 29.7
Field of education
Pedagogics/teacher training 4.7 3.4 5.0 3.3
Humanities/arts 5.2 4.8 4.3 5.6
Economics or social science 19.5 21.1 19.0 21.0
Natural science 2.1 2.4 3.1 2.7
Engineering 19.4 34.5 27.8 33.0
Agriculture and forestry 7.7 5.4 4.2 4.8
Social and health care 11.0 14.5 13.6 15.5
Service branch 10.0 13.8 8.6 13.5
Other 14.7 0.1 14.5 0.4
Occupational position
Manager or upper functionary 16.8 13.5 15.9 13.6
Lower functionary 12.9 20.0 10.0 20.1
Entrepreneur 10.0 6.4 8.9 6.3
Blue-collar worker 23.5 20.1 23.5 16.5
Student 5.8 7.2 4.7 6.9
Pensioner 25.5 23.1 31.7 25.1
Other 5.5 9.7 5.3 8.2
Apartment type
Detached house 50.5 40.1 49.3 39.2
Attached house 19.1 13.8 17.9 13.7
Apartment house 30.4 44.1 32.9 45.2
Other building 0 2.0 0 1.9
Table 2: Usefulness (very or fairly useful) of various devices in influencing the Finnish energy policy
in 2007 and 2016 (%)
Device 2007 2016
Instructing children on energy issues 94 88
Choosing scantly spending/”energy-pinching” appliances 92 88
Choosing eco-friendly products 90 87
Walking or cycling instead of driving 90 85
Dropping or supervision of dwelling temperature 84 79
Using so-called green electricity (produced by renewable energy) 77 79
Supervision of the use of electricity in the household * 79
Reducing private driving by favoring public transport 86 77
Lowering personal consumption level in general 86 77
Asking for competitive tenders from electricity companies 65 74
Reducing heating in leisure residence * 64
Reducing the use of sauna heated by electricity 63 62
Reducing air travels 68 61
Reducing the use of consumer electronics 67 58
Voting in elections 57 56
Discussion on energy issues with other people/friends 56 48
Acting in civic associations 41 30
Contacts with representatives of energy producing firms 25 27
Writing letters about energy issues to the editors of newspapers 39 24
Writing about energy issues on Internet discussion sites 30 23
Contacts with MPs 28 23
Contacts with public authorities 23 20
Participation in demonstrations 13 10
Radical environmental activism 13 10
N 1157 1308
*= was not inquired
Table 3: The proportion of the citizenry who perceived very or somewhat important the principles
concerning the process of energy policy-making in 2007 and 2016 (%)
Principle 2007 2016
Decision should be announced as openly as possible 96 95
Experts should be in charge of the drafting of decisions 96 94
Societal effects of decisions should be taken widely into account 93 94
Decisions should take account of various interest groups 67 69
Environmental effects of decisions should be taken
widely into account
95 92
Those politically responsible to the constituency
should be in charge of decision-making
54 56
The drafting process of decisions should be open 90 89
Citizens should be able to influence decisions 75 75
Experts should be in charge of decision-making 91 89
Representatives of firms should take part in
decision-making
62 66
Business organizations should play a central role
in decision-making
41 48
Decisions should be made by consensus based on
negotiations
65 64
Environmental organizations should play a central role
in decision-making
54 53
Energy policy should be determined free of
governmental direction
29 32
N 1189 1349
Table 4: The proportion of supporters for political consumerism and stealth democracy among various
socio-economic groups in 2007 and 2016 (%)
2007 2016
Political
consumerism
Stealth
democracy
Political
consumerism
Stealth
democracy
Basic education
Elementary school 48 78 45 79
Primary school 41 80 45 80
High school 46 77 51 78
p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 p>.05
Vocational education
No vocational education at all 52 74 42 75
Vocational course 49 82 54 82
Vocational school 44 79 43 78
Polytechnic 40 78 50 81
University 47 76 49 78
p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 p>.05
Age group
18-29 43 72 46 73
30-44 45 74 48 75
45-59 46 79 49 76
60-75 45 83 47 83
p>.05 p<.05 p>.05 p<.05
Gender
Men 35 78 43 77
Women 55 78 53 80
p<.001 p>.05 p<.001 p>.05
N 1189 1189 1349 1349
Table 5: Agreement (fully or somewhat) with the statements epitomizing the sense of civic efficacy
among supporters and non-supporters of political consumerism and stealth democracy in 2007 and
2016 (%)
Statement 2007 2016
A B C D A B C D
I am well acquaintant
with energy issues
41 48 46 42 60 55 60 49
Energy issues affected
my voting decision in
last general election
32 19 26 23 33 13 23 21
I am able to influence
the Finnish energy
policy by means of my
own activities
37 15 27 19 35 13 27 16
Citizens’ opinions have
not been heard
sufficiently when
making energy policy
decisions
* * * * 60 45 55 40
Voting in elections is
useful in influencing
energy policy
69 47 61 45 69 43 60 40
N 501 614 886 247 604 664 989 270
*= not inquired
A= Supporters of political consumerism
B= Non-supporters of political consumerism
C= Supporters of stealth democracy
D= Non-supporters of stealth democracy
